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The College Writing Committee celebrates the winners of SUNY Cortland's Eighth Annual Student 
Writing Contest and the winners of the Composition Program's Competition for the Outstanding Portfolio 
produced in CPN 100 Academic Writing I and CPN 101 Academic Writing II. The works in this booklet, 
which presents the winning entries in their entirety, were chosen from a large pool of submissions and 
represents some of the best student writing at SUNY Cortland for the 2005 calendar year. 
Lauren Hedger, an undergraduate student majoring in Inclusive Special Education, received an award in the 
category of Creative Writing for "Just One," written in FSA 103 for Professor Michelle Kelley. 
Andrew Kelly, an undergraduate student majoring in Professional Writing, received an award in the 
category of Creative Nonfiction for "Thoughts on Writing (Struggling to Fall Asleep)," written in 
PWR 295 for Professor David Franke. 
Christopher Johnston, a graduate student in English Education, received an award in the category of 
Creative Nonfiction for "In Reference to a Lifeless Thing," written in ENG 504 for Distinguished Teaching 
Professor Mary Lynch Kennedy. 
Jacqueline Deal, a graduate student in English Education, received an award in the category of Creative 
Writing lor "To My First Lover," written in ENG 529 for Professor Victoria Boynton. 
Joan Martin, an undergraduate student majoring in English, received an award in the category of Academic 
Writing for "As You Like It, You Know? Like and You Know in the English language, Irom Beowulf 
to the Borg," written in ENG 407 for Professor Paul Washburn. 
Erin LaBarge, an undergraduate student, received the Outstanding Portfolio Award for "Arguments About 
Arguments" and "Backwards America," written in CPN 100 for Professor Tim Emerson. 
Amanda Marshall, an undergraduate student, received the Outstanding Portfolio Award for "Intelligence 
Discrepancies Between Men and Women" and "Calculated Risk: A Critical Response," written in CPN 101 
for Professor Tim Emerson. 
I he judging teams lor the two contests included faculty members on the College Writing Committee and 
instructors in the English Department's Composition Program. 
Interested in participating in nextyear's contest? 
Please read the guidelinesfor submission on the last page of this booklet. 
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cTen Black fingers wipe away the pain. 
Nine tears roll down his dark cheek. 
Eight eyes point, stare, and laugh. 
Seven students witness this crime and ignore it. 
Six blocks, he ran to his home. 
Five fingers clenched in a fist of anger. 
Four days he spent in this new White school. 
Three numbers made the combination. 
Two fingers pulled the trigger in pain. 
To stop this tragedy, it would have only taken one. 
'Ihouifts on f VVritiaq (.Struqqlinq to t]Faff cSitvf) 
Andrew Kellev 
c^Vritins is a crush. A crush on a beautiful girl who sits across from me in class, 
her hair splashed and highlighted from coming out of summer. She's got that smell, the 
one that hits you no matter how far away you are like a faint glimpse of some glory. Her 
neck is tan and leads perfectly into the muscles of her shoulder blades and 1 have 
absolutely no idea what to do with her. No matter how much I think about her, no matter 
how much I ta lk about her with my friends- no matter how often I write about my writing-
it's a shadow 
Like the girl (I have one in mind, it's helping), the writing seems so distant to me. 
It's been put on such a high pedestal that I've almost talked myself out of being able to do 
it. 1 have a lot easier time imagining it than doing it. I can come up with a billion 
scenarios in my head of the two of us existing together but I cannot imagine it ever 
becoming reality. It's a detached sort of feeling- even when I'm in the heart of writing, 
when I'm hot and in the "zone" as some people call it, I still don't feel like I'm really 
doing it. 
I've had some terrible, aching crushes on girls before and eventually I started 
speaking to them (mostly through chance), and I've become good friends with some of 
them. I've written before, I've received A's. I've done a few pieces of writing that 
people claim are good, just like I've become friends with some of these girls who are 
beautiful. 
If writing is a crush, and if I've started talking to her, then writing and I are in the 
very beginning stages of our relationship. We haven't had any sort of major conflict, no 
arguments; so far I've gotten enough good reactions out of my writing that the few spots 
of soreness can be ignored. Everything is still pretty fresh, we've got quite a bit to learn 
about each other. And within the writing, just like a new relationship, I'm not quite sure 
what my role should be, exactly. 
Do I always make myself the aggressor? Should I tel l her exactly where we're 
going on the date, and take charge; should I go into the writing knowing exactly what I 
want out of it, and take no detours? Maybe that's not how my style is going to develop, 
though. Sometimes she isn't the type of girl who responds well to that; when I write, I 
might have to let it develop on its own. The story builds itself organically. It is an 
impulsive, spur of the moment date to the movies. 
Since the relationship is so new, it's hard to say where we're headed. If we get 
more serious, and I start writing as a career, then we will have to have that first fight. 
That first violent argument where you take a step back and question the entire mess that 
led up to it; is it worth it? Suddenly I'll be questioning the moments we've had together. 
Did I misinterpret something? Should I ha ve spent so much time with her, ignoring 
everything else for her? Those times when we sat up all night talking about death, 
flowers, movies, and cooking... 
But then, writing is like cooking. But it isn't done in the kitchen, it isn't quite as 
tangible. But I co ok all the time. I w ill cook for anyone, all they have to do is ask. If I'm 
cooking for mysell, I almost always make more than I k now I w ill eat, just in case 
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someone happens to walk past the kitchen. If someone asks me to write them into a story, 
write them a specific type of piece, or just write with them in mind- I've got no problem 
with that. 
In fact, it motivates me even more. When I'm cooking for myself, I can 
experiment with the ingredients; not enough setting, way too much dialogue. Balance out 
the characterization with the irony and there we have it- and who knows how its going to 
turn out? You never really know with a new recipe until possibly hours later, when it's 
cooled and you can finally sink your teeth into it. 
I know what I p ersonally need to get out of a piece of writing, because I m yself 
usually enjoy the cooking more than the meal. It can take me 6 hours to marinate a steak, 
twenty minutes to grill it, and then only fifteen minutes to eat it. But I'm not cooking for 
myself anymore- I've go the other person. Now I've got to get all my ingredients lined up 
and planned, measured and exact. Balancing the elements of a story tailored to your 
audience is extremely satisfying when it works out, because the audience can see the 
effort and planning involved. 
One particular time when all my ingredients came together perfectly was during a 
story I wrote for a class abroad (Psychoanalysis and Writing). The assignment was to 
bring together a short story wile using references to psychoanalytical terms, with someone 
we knew as the model for the story. Now that is a very specific recipe, that is a specific 
audience. 
There's no way I can just whip that up in twenty minutes before my guest arrives; 
that isn't something I ca n write two hours before class begins. The person I'm feeding 
will know if I "half-ass" it, in the words of my dad. More than any other assignment that 
semester, I worried about this one. I had absolutely no idea what to make, I had no list of 
ingredients that I w as going to blend together into a cohesive and balanced piece. But 
sometimes, the list just falls into your lap, the inspiration pops and that's when you can 
start working like the butcher; you just chop right into that piece and absolutely nail it. 
I had a friend in England named Kevin, who for lack of a better term was a stoner. 
Kevin liked to smoke, drink, eat Doritos and watch soccer. He didn't like people who got 
dramatic, he didn't like conceited or arrogant loud mouths. And Kevin had this shaggy, 
lumberjack looking beard that he definitely did not like hearing criticism about. That 
right there doesn't sound like the perfect story at all but... 
Combine it with a few terms (castration anxiety, narcissism, spectral image), 
blend well, and all the sudden I had it. I wrote about Kevin as an office worker tormented 
by an arrogant, slick, yuppie of a boss who kept trying to force Kevin into conforming; 
mostly by shaving his beard clean. I g ave the boss a floor length mirror and some golf 
clubs, and the story wrote itself. I was able to show the audience exactly what they 
needed to see, without putting it blatantly in front of them. You shouldn't have to watch 
the chef prepare the food to know what flavors he's trying to display; I never had to 
openly use the terms I w as referring to, and yet they were there as undertones and 
symbols, like the subliminal hints of a dream... 
And writing is a dream too. I don't mean this in some girly, superficial way. I 
don't mean that writing for me is so perfect and dreamlike that no matter what happens 
I'll wake up with a smile, and I ce rtainly don't mean that it's about unicorns and fairy 
tales. What I do mean is that it is unpredictable, it is risky and not everyone has a vivid 
5 
A. Kelly 
grasp on it. 
Writing is creating an atmosphere, it's sliding images, references and dialogue. 
It's a beautifully lucid dream that I c an have under my control. It's that one moment 
where I finally realize I'm dreaming, and I h ave the power to either go further into the 
depths of nightmare and ecstasy, memory and what is soon to come...or 1 can wake up. 
It is the enjoyable dream of being with my friends around a campfire- but 
suddenly the group has gone, and I f ind myself alone in the field, watching the stars blur 
and melt into one another in a terrifying, suffocating loneliness. I can enter a piece of 
writing with a plan and a strong start, and suddenly find myself lost. Where the hell is the 
rest of my story? Where do I go next? Why can't I find my way out of the field? 
A good dreamer can take those vivid images and apply logic to them to find out 
what the subliminal, subconscious meaning could have been. A good writer can take 
these images and plant them right back into the story: a good writer does not have to sleep 
to dream. I did this in one of my other stories about a man in a coma, which has gone 
through at least 10 different versions, all of different lengths and moods. Dropping in 
lines about spitting out teeth evokes powerful memories of dreams, because this is a 
common image in dreams (representing guilt). Mausoleums are obviously loss and 
illness, whereas hospitals are the need to heal and move on from this trauma. By putting 
these images into the story, I was able to give the reader the feeling of being inside a 
dream, even when it was not obviously stated. 
Just like writing, after the dream is finished I have the opportunity to analyze it 
and pick it apart. I c an tell my friends about the dream just like I can show them my 
writing. I can tell Billy that last night I dreamt he died in a fire, or I can just write a story 
and kill him in it- and that's certainly a lot of fun. 
Writing is a dream for exactly the same reason writing is a crush and cooking- it is 
about possibilities. It isn't certain where any of it is ever going to lead. I may never even 
know what her voice sounds like when she's saying my name quietly. I m ay never get to 
cook for her-1 may never find the right recipe, the right taste. I may never dream of 
anything other than nightmares. But I don't know that just yet... 
Writing is the unknown. 
in cHtjaem to a Jfjfffos Sfiiinq 
Chris lohnston 
cThere is a place I lo ve. 1 wish I could describe it, but I love it too much. Think of the 
place you love: the slope of rocks jutting above water, the corner of Washington and 
Myrtle Avenue in Brooklyn, the circle of your babysitter's arms, your mother's closet, 
your block. Think of the place you love, and you'll know what I'm writing about. 
One: In a hammock in the place I lo ve, a hundreds yards or so from a cluster of cabins. 
My sister approaches. No one else is around. I'm six. She's older. 
Two: We're both in the hammock, swaying side by side. I'm not sure what happened 
between her approaching and her sitting next to me. Maybe that's the crucial moment. 
Maybe she pirouetted or stumbled; maybe I told her she was an ugly fish head; maybe I 
told her to go away. Just because I don't remember, doesn't mean it isn't memorable. 
Three: We stare at the sky, the hammock slowly stopping beneath scuttling clouds. Are 
we talking? I c an't hear us. We didn't talk very much. My sister and me. 
Four: A silver jet. Vague and foreboding at first, then deafening, unnerving, everywhere, 
and then above us, a malevolent arrowhead, hurtling just a stone's throw away. As the jet 
passes overhead, it breaks the sound barrier, the slowly stopping, swaying hammock 
shudders, and the air we breathe reverberates with noise. 
Five: A few moments later. I th ink we've said nothing, but I'm not sure. My sister turns 
to me and says, 
"You had an older brother." 
"No, I d idn't." 
"Yes, you did." 
"Where is he now?" 
"He's dead." 
"No, I didn't." 
"His name was Tim. He's dead." 
Six: My sister reads in the hammock. 1 walk through the horseshoe pit toward the 
glinting, cold river. 
Years later, I'm fourteen. My sister's older. Mom bakes fish and sautes vegetables. We 
live in England, in a duplex, and I take a double-decker bus to school in the morning. I 
ride on the bottom level. The top is for oily-faced, punked-out, fag smokers. Fm only 
oily-faced. But this isn't relevant; this isn't what I'm writing about. 
One: Mom bakes fish and sautes vegetables. My sister and I w atch a British Soap Opera 
on the tele. We don't talk. 
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Two: We're all at the table. How does it come up? What are we talking about that leads 
ineluctably to Tim? Every effect has a cause; it must have come from somewhere. But 
memory fails and too often we forget why and only remember what. 
What: My dad is softly, not sadly, talking about the months that Timmy was alive. 
Mom, who is a talker, doesn't. 
"I remember when I fir st learned about Tim," I interrupt, startled, thinking, is this 
part of the same story? "It was at Golden Trout, in the hammock. Carrie told me. There 
was a jet." The air we breathe reverberates, and dad is shaking his head. 
"Really?" he responds generously. "I'm sure we told you before that." 
"No," I say. "I remember that I didn't know. When she told me, I didn't know. I 
learned it from her." 
There is a pause, as if something is wrong. What is it? What's wrong? And then 
dad shrugs, kindly. "It happened a long time ago," he says. And I'm not quite sure what 
he is talking about. I only know that when I th ink about Tim, I think about finding out. I 
think about the place I love. That is him for me. That's all. That's it. 
It: that one ~ used as subject or direct object or indirect object of a verb or object of a 




Just because I don't remember, doesn't mean it isn't memorable. 
' To 5Mij cjRrst Jjvrr 
Jacqueline Deal 
4&st night I sat sipping Jack and diet 
Through a skinny red straw 
In a dive bar I p robably threw up behind 
When we were young and tough and cool. 
Someone said you died. 
Overdosed. 
But that can't be right because: 
I did my first line of coke in your orange Camaro and 
You still have a Polaroid of my stringy body 
In something black and lacy and 
You were supposed to go to California and be famous 
For us both. 
9 
As ' Vou JPjfct Jt 'Vou cXnow'P 
Jfjfc and (n t he Inqfisli Jianquaqc, 
from ' Beowulf to t he 'B orq 
_^___ joan Martin 
)n the epilogue to Shakespeare's As You Like It, Rosamund apologetically asks the 
audience to "like as much of this play as please you" (V.iv.13-14). The statement is 
ironic, since her audience has already had to sit through the whole play, whether they 
liked it or not. The contemporary audience who inadvertently listens in on any typical 
American teenager's phone conversation for more than few minutes may or may not like 
what they hear, either. The word like, and the phrase you know, will probably occur at 
least once and possibly several times. The expressions like andyou know emerged from 
the youth culture of Southern California about thirty years ago, and since then they have 
surfed into living rooms, classrooms, and boardrooms across the country and around the 
world (Eckert and Mendoza-Denton 1). This precocious pair have become almost 
automatic verbal reflexes, superseding um, ah, and well, particularly for people born after 
1960. Infiltrating our speech and culture, they have become the linguistic equivalent of 
McDonald's, and, like hamburgers and French fries, they often go together. 
At best, like and you know are hallmarks of the dynamic ability of the ever-changing 
English language, and of American English in particular, to adapt and mold itself to the 
ideas, styles, and world view of each new generation. At worst, they are grave symptoms 
of a malady that David Orr, quoting C.S. Lewis, calls "verbicide," a condition in which 
we are flooded with a "sheer volume of words and data." while at the same time 
experiencing what Orr describes as "a national epidemic of incoherence" (Orr 26). In a 
study of conversations among young people in Southern California, Jucker and Smith 
note that "like occurs about once every twenty-one seconds in conversations between 
strangers, and once every thirteen seconds in conversations between friends" (183). 
Whether we like it or not, like and you know are here to stay, and we, like Rosamund's 
audience, need to make the best of it. 
Several questions arise. What does the word like really mean? What do we assume 
the listener knows—or doesn't know—when we ask or say, you know? What are the 
etymological histories of like and know, and can they help us figure out why these two 
words in particular have become so popular and prevalent? 
Etymology of like 
Why do people like like? It h as become the WalMart special of North American speech. 
One of the reasons it is used so frequently may have to do with its history. The word like 
has an extensive and interesting legacy; the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) entries for 
the various forms of like amount to twenty-seven pages of twelve-point, single-spaced 
text when printed out (this does not include meanings for derived forms such as "likely" 
and "likewise"). The OED has entries for like as a verb, noun, adjective, and adverb. The 
adverb form alone has further listings for like as "a quasi-preposition and conjunction"; as 
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a "dialect and vulgar" word used to "qualify a preceding statement"; and as a "colloquial" 
used as "a meaningless interjection or expletive" (OED). The bottom line is that like, at 
one time or another, has represented almost every conceivable part of speech in the 
English language, each with multiple meanings and connotations. This versatility may 
partially account for its historical and current popularity, and the authority of the OED 
notwithstanding, its frequent use may not be "meaningless" (OED). 
The word like derives from the Old English word gelik; the Old English -lie means 
body or having the form of and variations occur in other languages of Anglo-Saxon 
origin, such as Old Frisian and Old German (Watkins 49). Gelik is also related to the 
German word leiche, which means corpse, and the Gothic word leik, which means body 
or corpse (apparently, the Goths were Gothic even back then). The English term lych-
gate, which describes the roofed entry or gateway in front of a church where a bier is 
placed before burial, derives from this meaning (OED). The earliest documentation of 
like in the OED dates from the year 971 in an archaic verb form meaning "to please, be 
pleasing, suit a person." 
The prefix ge- or ga- in gelik is equivalent to the Latin com-, which means same or 
common, so it can be translated common body, from which we get conform (OED). This 
comparative meaning of the word evolved into our modern use of like in similes or other 
comparative statements such as "He eats like a pig." An example of this use of like, given 
in the OED. is seen in the fourteenth century when Chaucer, in his Canterbury Tales, 
describes the Reeve's hair as being "dokked lik a preest beforn;" (GP 592). Shakespeare 
also uses this sense of the word in his 1601 play Twelfth Night when the clown says, 
"Fools are as like husbands, as Pilchers are to Herrings" (Ill.i.34). 
As an adjective, the word can be used to mean "having the same characteristics or 
qualities as some other place or thing [...]" (OED), as in this example from an 
eighteenth- century cookbook quoted in the OED: " Dried herring [ .. . ] should be 
steeped the like time as the Whiting in small beer" (Glasse 161). As a noun, one can talk 
about one's likes, as in likes and dislikes: "Her likes and dislikes are arbitrary and 
unpredictable." 
Like, in the verb form, means "to derive pleasure of [... ] approve of, become fond 
of (OED), as in "I like coffee ice cream." It can indicate a lesser degree of fondness than 
the word love, for example: "I like coffee ice cream, but I love chocolate ice cream 
more." Frequently, it is also used in the affectionate or romantic sense: "I really like that 
new girl in our English class." In Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing, there is an 
entertaining passage of wordplay involving the words like and love between Margaret and 
Borachio: 
BOR. Well, I wou ld you did like me. 
MARG. So would not I for your own sake, for I hav e many ill qualities. 
BOR. Which is one? 
MARG. I say my prayers aloud. 
BOR. I lov e you the better; the hearers may cry amen. (Il.i. 100-105) 
One derivation, likerous, was even used in Chaucer's "The Miller's Tale" to indicate 
wantoness or lechery: "She was so ... sweete and likerous, / I dare wel sayn, if she had 
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been a mous, / And he a cat, he wolde hire hente ('pounce') anoon" (MilT, 237-39). 
Some uses are now obsolete, for example, like as a form of the verb to lick (OED), and 
Shakespeare's use of like to mean fashion or represent, as when John Talbot says, in I 
Henry VI, "Like me to the pesant Boyes of France" (JV.vi.48). During the 1950's and 
60's, considerable controvery was generated by a cigarette advertisement which stated, 
"Winston tastes good like a cigarette should" (Jucker and Ziv 183). Many people strongly 
felt that the word as should have been used instead of like; one of the memorable 
"highlights" of annual family car trips to Florida was that my mother shared this opinion 
each time the car passed one of the innumerable Winston billboards in the Carolinas. 
Obviously, the word like has a long linguistic pedigree. Like the English language itself, 
it is versatile and adaptable, and if some applications of like have become obsolete, new 
ones have appeared. 
Constructions using like and the like quotative 
The following is a hypothetical, yet typical, teenage phone conversation in which the 
speaker is repeating to one friend the conversation she has had with another friend: 
"I'm like, "Let's go to the mall," and she's like, "Yeah, there's this gray T-shirt at 
Hollister I really like" and I'm like, "Is it the gray one with the seagull?" and she's like, 
"Yeah, I really want that one" and I'm like, "No way, I alr eady have it, and what if we like 
wore it on the same day?" Like is used three ways in this conversation. First, it is used in 
place of the verb say (or the past tense said); second, to indicate preference; and third, as 
an interjection between we and wore. 
John Singler calls the use of like in place of say or said to introduce quoted speech the 
"like quotative" (Singler 1). Unlike older people, who traditionally use the words say, 
ask, or tell, to report conversational speech, younger speakers favor the word like most of 
the time. In one study, high school and college students in the New York metropolitan 
area used like at least two-thirds of the time to introduce quotations (Singler 1). 
Singler notes that unlike say or said, which indicate an attempt to accurately report 
the exact wording of a person's speech, like is often used to "approximate" the repeated 
conversation. It may conveys a person's intent, or underlying attitude, but not necessarily 
the exact words originally used to indicate that intent. As Singler observes, 
"Sometimes, the like quotative is used to express an 'inner monologue,' representing 
what the speaker thought to herself/himself but did not actually say aloud" (Singler 2). I 
observed an excellent example of this last spring. My fifteen year-old son came home 
from school one day and said in an angry tone, "Ms. X was like, 'We'll be doing practice 
Regents exams every day for the rest of the school year,' and I was like, 'That's stupid, 
I'm not going to waste my time doing that.'" Somewhat alarmed, I asked, "Did you really 
say that to her?," and he said, "No, but I thought it." 
The use of the like quotative in association with paralinguistic features such as hand 
gestures, facial expressions, and body language such as shrugging (Singler 2), are 
characteristics of a style of American teenage communication which began in California 
in the 1960's and has spread throughout mainstream America and to other English-
speaking places, such as England, Australia, South Africa, and Singapore (Singler 1). 
In the fascinating PBS documentary, Do You Speak American?, Robert MacNeil 
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tours the United States and explores the various dialects and language variations found 
around the country. He devotes a large segment of the documentary to "Valley Girl" and 
"Surfer Dude," the female and male versions of contemporary Californian "youthspeak" 
(Singler 4) which have become predominant across the country. MacNeil interviews a 
group of young girls whose speech is characterized, among other things, by incessant use 
of the word like, distinctive hand gestures, and rising intonation at the end of most 
sentences (Cran and MacNeil 12-15). 
In another segment of Do You Speak American?. MacNeil interviews a young snow 
boarder named Jayk, who manages to use the word like thirteen times in seventy-four 
words while bemoaning the fact that people outside of his own peer group often don't 
understand him: 
Yeah like I l ike what I say like sometimes people just don't understand it like I, like my 
terminology for certain things which is like, like whom I c lique, my group, like my 
friends, like nobody else understands it so if I go someplace else, or some place new they 
are like, they don't know it so like and they are like, they are like what are you talking 
about? (Cran and MacNeil, 21-22) 
Eckert and Mendoza-Denton point out that Valley Girl and Surfer Dude have had less 
of an impact on African-American, Asian, and Chicano youth populations, even in 
California, than on white teenagers across the country. These ethnic groups have 
maintained their own distinctive dialects despite constant exposure to contemporary 
California "white" speech in both the mainstream and youth media (Eckert and Mendoza-
Denton 1-3). 
A third construction with like occurs in the hypothetical telephone conversation 
above: "[...] what if we like wore it on the same day?" This construction is commonly 
heard in interactions between teens. It involves using like as an interjection between the 
pronoun and verb in a sentence: "We like went to get a Coke," and "If you like go with 
me, it will be more fun." Jean Fox Tree discusses this use of the word like to focus the 
listener's attention on what the speaker is saying or to highlight certain aspects of the 
conversation (Fox Tree 736). It appears that the interjection of like before the action 
part of the sentence, the verb, gives the dialogue a faster pace and a sense of liveliness. 
Like it or not, like and you know have become an established part of America's 
descriptive grammar, and like kudzu vine, have overwhelmed everyday American speech. 
According to Singler, "The like quotative has become a part of the English of virtually all 
native speakers of American English under the age of forty. As such, it can be said to be 
a part of the grammar of English" (Singler 3). 
A question that follows is, "Why like? " Why don't we use some other word, instead 
of like, to the same extent? One reason may be its multiple meanings and use as various 
parts of speech, as the above brief exploration of its etymology has shown. Also, like 
sounds good and is easy to say. It is short, snappy, and crisp, an upbeat one-syllable 
word. On first impression, it leads to linguistic confusion, but at least it is optimistic 
confusion. Like is better than hate or a host of other words we could use. After a short 
exploration of the origins of know, and its precocious child,you know, further reasons for 
the prevalence of like and you know, derived from the branch of linguistics called 
discourse analysis, will be presented. Also, it will be seen that words that appear to 
contribute to confusion and vagueness may actually have the opposite effect-that of 
enhancing communication and improving verbal efficiency. 
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Etymology of know 
An etymological analysis of the word know shows a pattern similar to that of like. It has a 
long history of multiple meanings and applications. Know first appeared in Old English as 
[ \ecnawan, and is derived from the same root as the words can and ken. The earliest 
literary source documented in the OED is from Beowulf, c. 1000 A.D., where it is used in 
the sense of "to perceive [... ] recognize; to identify" (OED). A translation of a line 
quoted in the OED appears in Seamus Heaney's version of the epic poem: "Now, my 
friend, don't you recognize [ ]ecnawan) / your father's sword, his favorite weapon," 
(Beowulf 2047). Of interest is the fact that it "came down as late as 1400 in form 
iknowen YKNOW" (OED). Could this be the origin of our current phrase you know'? It 
is an interesting speculation. Know would have been pronounced k-now: the k- would 
not be silent and -now would rhyme with cow (DiCicco, personal comment). The sense 
in which we use know in current American speech means "to be cognizant, conscious, or 
aware of [... ] to understand" (OED). The common expression you know is used 
"parenthetically [... ] as a mere conversational filler" and related variants include don 7 
you know and doncher (OED). Writing in 1880, Mark Twain comments on the use of 
you know in informal speech: "Nothing gives such an air of grace and elegance and 
unconstraint to a German or English conversation as to scatter it full of'also's' or 'you-
knows"' (OED). Twain's observation is ironically prophetic, given the frequency with 
which you know is used today. Novelists as proper and prominent as Jane Austen filled 
the dialogue of her characters with know's: "Do you know, I saw the prettiest hat 
you can imagine" (OED, Northanger Abbey 24). This can easily be translated into 
current teen vernacular: "I like saw this cool hat, y'know?" Frequently in informal 
conversation, you know is not pronounced carefully or clearly. It often comes out as 
y'noh or even y'nuh, expressed as a rapid nasalization instead of being fully enunciated in 
the mouth (Washburn, personal comment). Perhaps this pronunciation is a modem 
throwback to the 1400's Middle English formyknow (OED). 
Discourse analysis and discourse markers 
The science of discourse analysis, the formal study of how people communicate through 
written and spoken language (McArthur 316), has contributed to a large body of research 
which actually demonstrates logical explanations for the use of like andyow know, even in 
the illogical setting of teenage conversation. In discourse analysis, expressions such as 
like and you know are called discourse markers. Linguists disagree about the exact 
definition of discourse markers1, and Andreas Jucker-who has done a significant research 
on like, you know, and other features of contemporary speech-admits, "It appears that 
'discourse marker' is a fuzzy concept" (Jucker and Ziv 2). However, he cites four 
features of discourse markers, as described by Holker: 
(1) they do not affect the truth conditions of an utterance; (2) they do not add 
anything to the propositional content of an utterance; (3) they are related to the speech 
situation and not to the situation talked about; (4) they have an emotive, expressive 
function rather than a referential, denotative, or cognitive function (Jucker and Ziv 3). 
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As will be seen below, even some of the points of this basic definition of features can be 
contested. 
Gisle Anderson of Norway disagrees with the OED's assertion that like is "a 
meaningless interjection or expletive" (OED) when used as a discourse marker. He 
believes that it "plays an important role in connection with the loose use of language" 
(152). He cites an example sentence, "We were having baths together when we were like 
two years old," and explains that "The function of like is precisely to signal that the 
speaker is opting for a loose interpretation of her beliefs, thus like can be considered a 
looseness marker. Like appears to provide an explicit signal of a discrepancy between the 
propositional form of the utterance and the thought it represents" (Anderson 152-53). 
Rather than being "the traditional English teacher's" equivalent of "verbal garbage," 
Jean Fox Tree and Josef Schrock explain that discourse markers such as you know serve 
several important roles in conversation. These roles include helping to establish a 
friendly atmosphere; encouraging shared understanding; decreasing social distance; and 
creating deliberate imprecision, which allows "the addressees more room to express their 
opinions" (730). They have also studied the use oiyou know to stall for time; stalling 
gives the speaker the opportunity to plan speech, select words, adjust meaning, and 
forewarn the listener of changes in the direction of the conversation (729-31). In 
addition, the use of the phrase you know, with varying intonations, can aid in turn 
management. In other words, it is a way for the speaker to indicate to the listener that she 
is either continuing or completing a thought and gives verbal cues as to when it will be 
the listener's turn to reply (732). Also, frequent use of you know helps the listener to 
focus on the narrative and to highlight important parts of the narrative (736). The 
speaker's use of you know reaches out to the listener and draws them into the narrative 
process in a sympathetic way: "I went to the beach yesterday, you know, and I got like 
the wickedest sunburn." According to Fox 'free and Schrock, "Tow know invites the 
addressee to complete the argument by drawing the appropriate inferences" (737). 
The research team of Jucker, Smith, and Fudge, also discuss the use of discourse 
markers, including like and you know, as hedges in a conversation. A hedge, or 
downtoner, indicates that the speaker's statement is an approximate description of a fact 
or event, not a literal or exact description. Hedges such as like can be used to tone down 
or soften a complaint or criticism (1746-47): "I was like so mad when you hung up on 
me!" Like can also be used with other hedges, such as kind of in the same sentence, and 
Jucker gives an example of a triple hedge which was recorded in his study: "she was like 
kind of like my supervisor" (1747). Our contemporary use of like and you know as 
hedges, derived from American youth culture, is not without precedent on the other side 
of the Atlantic. In MacNeil's The Story of English, a Welsh speaker observes: "We also 
have a habit of using throw away words-like, indeed, look you-and I think this originally 
started because we couldn't finish the translation from Welsh [into English] in time. So a 
word like indeed became an important stop-gap" (52). 
When discourse markers are used as hedges and downtoners, they introduce an 
element of vagueness into a conversation, but this is not necessarily a bad thing. Jucker, 
Smith, and Fudge say that rather than being "a deplorable deviation from precision and 
clarity," vague expressions can foster communication by serving a social function and 
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establishing social bonds (1737, 1766). Vagueness may actually encourage interaction, 
rather than hinder it, in the area of measurement, or when time, money, or quantity are 
being discussed. When like is used to estimate quantity, it is called an approximator 
(1739). for example, the first "precise" sentence below is much harder to comprehend 
than the second "vague" sentence, in which like serves as an approximator: 
1) I spent one hundred and eight dollars and thirty-seven cents at Aeropostale 
in Pyramid mall at two fifty-seven p.m. yesterday. 
2) 1 spent like a hundred bucks at Aero at the mall yesterday afternoon. 
The second expression actually results in "greater efficiency" (1739) in the conversation, 
since it decreases the verbal production efforts required of the speaker and the mental 
processing efforts required of the listener (1759). Of course in some situations, such as 
an accounting department audit, a statement such as "I'm short like twenty bucks," would 
not be appropriate. 
There is an implicit understanding that the use of similes involving like will be vague 
and/or hyperbolic (1740). If the speaker says, "I ate like a horse," no listener would really 
think that she got down on all fours and cropped grass with her teeth or stood in a stall 
with a feedbag on her nose. We have been taught not to take such statements literally, yet 
we understand the underlying meaning: "I was really hungry and ate a lot of food." As 
Jucker concludes, the use of discourse markers such as like and you know in "vague 
expressions appear[s] to serve a variety of functions in conversation [... ] they are not 
just a poor substitute for a precise expression. Rather, they often convey meaning that is 
different from, and more relevant than a precise expression would. That is, they help 
guide the hearer towards the best interpretation of the speaker's intention" (1766). One of 
the reasons like may be favored as a discourse marker is that it can function as more than 
one part of speech, even within a single conversation. In view of these findings, it would 
appear that Holker's above list of four characteristics of discourse markers needs 
amendment. The speaker's use of like and you know in conversation, as hedges and 
looseness indicators, and the effects on the hearer's interpretation of the speaker's intent, 
do involve cognitive function (perhaps on a subconscious level), and do affect the 
truthfulness or litcralness of the speaker's intent. 
In an article with the wonderful title, "And people just you know like 'wow': 
Discourse Markers as Negotiating Strategies," Jucker and Smith analyze the frequency of 
discourse markers in taped conversations among college students in Long Beach, 
California. There are 2811 discourse markers used in three and one-half hours of 
conversation, or one every four to five seconds. They state, "[...] the two most frequent 
discourse markers (yeah and like) comprise over half of all the tokens in the analyzed 
conversations. Together with the third and fourth most frequent markers, oh and you 
know, they comprise three quarters of all tokens. Thus there can be no doubt about the 
pervasiveness of these markers in conversation" (176). They categorize yeah as a 
"reception marker" which the recipient of information uses to "enhance common ground 
between speaker and addressee" (179) and to acknowledge or confirm the receipt of new 
information. Like, on the other hand, is categorized as a "presentation marker" which 
"provides processing instructions to the addressee" and "indicates the level of relevance 
that should be attributed to his utterance" (188). "All its uses can be subsumed under its 
core function of flagging linguistic expressions [ ... J as less than literal representations 
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of the thoughts they are intended to represent" (191). In other words, the various 
functions of like as a discourse marker—as an indicator of looseness, as an approximator 
of time or quantity, and as a hedge or downtoner-fulfill the role of facilitating the 
hearer's understanding of the speaker's level of exactness and intent. Even if it can be 
demonstrated that like and you know have specific functions in conversation, a legitimate 
question arises: are like and you know being overused in today's language culture, and if 
so, who is to blame? 
The Role of the Media 
It would be easy to blame the media-television in particular-for the spread of Valley 
Girl/Surfer Dude dialect in general and the use of like and you know in particular. Jack 
Chambers points out that the media is good at disseminating specific buzzwords, but 
there is little evidence that the media affects the basic speech patterns of everyday people, 
even in communities where media outreach is strong: "Groups such as inner-city 
African-Americans, with an average daily media exposure of eight hours, use dialects and 
accents that are becoming less like the standard accents heard on TV (1). He states that 
the inclusion of buzzwords or fad expressions in movies and sitcoms actually follows, not 
precedes, actual changes in speech patterns within a culture. He argues that mobility 
around the country, and even around the globe, may be a more potent force in language 
evolution than the media is (1). 
Robert MacNeil notes: 
It might also be argued that more Americans hear more correct, even beautiful, 
English on television than was ever heard before. Through television more models of 
good usage reach more American homes than was ever possible in other times ("English 
Belongs to Everybody" 540). 
Even il television, pop radio, and the movie industry are partly responsible for the 
original spread of like and related expressions across the country, peer interactions are 
probably as strong an influence on the speech and language trends in a community and 
across the country as any other factor, particularly among the excruciatingly peer-
sensitive teen population. 
Implications for Teachers 
An obvious question arises: should teachers should try to influence or regulate the use of 
discourse markers such as like and you know in the classroom, and if so, to what extent? 
One approach is to consider the medium and mode used to communicate information. 
The medium is the method of transmission, such as print (paper or newspaper), audio 
(radio or cassette), or oral (lecture or conversation). The mode is the purpose or 
application ol the information: examples include informal conversation, academic 
presentation, legal document or analysis, and advertising, to name a few (McCarthy and 
Carter 4-9). The instructor might choose to ignore the presence and frequency of 
discourse markers during a question-and-answer session or a casual classroom discussion 
but encourage limitations during prepared oral presentations. Discussion about the 
presence and positive functions of discourse markers can lead to student awareness of 
when and how they use like and you know. An open and lighthearted approach might be 
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more effective in helping students to recognize and evaluate the appropriateness of 
discourse markers in various situations than a sweeping judgment which says, "that isn't 
good English." McCarthy and Carter present a series of activities which can increase 
students' understanding of how discourse markers and other features of spoken language 
help interpret the direction and intent of conversations (206). They also consider the 
appropriateness of discourse markers and other "informal" conventions in textbooks and 
curriculum materials and the effect their inclusion has on student engagement with and 
interest in the material being presented (75). 
Conclusion 
The discourse analysis studies summarized above show a specific function and purpose 
for like and you know in everyday conversation. However things are changing, even for 
these two overwhelmingly popular words. The like quotative is being replaced on the 
west coast by the phrase, "I'm all," (Cran and MacNeil) as in, "She's all, 'let's go to the 
mall,' and I'm all, 'Not today, I've got a headache.'" In his "Sounding Off column in 
the Daytona Beach News-Journal, writer Ken Hornack complains that the frequent and 
"aggravating" you know's uttered by athletes during interviews are now being superseded 
by the "insulting," and "condescending" query, "You know what?" uttered by 
sportscasters at the beginning of every observation they make during interviews or sports 
commentaries (Hornack). 
The totally unrestricted use of like and you know is not appropriate for all situations 
and circumstances, and there is one other important concern. At the beginning of Do You 
Speak American?, the narrator says, "How we talk defines who we are" (Cran and 
MacNeil). Even comedian and language commentator George Carlin, who is sometimes 
offensive but usually perceptive, states, "The quality of our thoughts and ideas can only 
be as good as our language" (Carlin). Supposedly, Shakespeare had a working 
vocabulary of about 30,000 words, while the estimated vocabulary of the "average 
educated person" today is around 15,000 words (McCrum 102). Admittedly, there is a 
great deal of disagreement about actual numbers; some sources feel the modern 
vocabulary contains 30,000 words or more, depending on the exact definition of 
vocabulary and word, and whether derivations count as the same word or a different 
word (McArthur 1090-92). Orr states, "In the past 50 years [. . . ] the working 
vocabulary of the average 14 year-old has declined from some 25,000 words to 10, 000 
words. This is not merely a decline in the number of words but in the capacity to think" 
(Orr 26). As shown, Jucker and Smith clock discourse markers as occurring once every 
four to five seconds in college undergraduate conversations (176). In a typical, recent 
class discussion in a SUNY Cortland English class, one student used like seven times and 
likely once in a comment lasting no more than two minutes: this from an English major in 
an upper level course. Regardless of any question of correctness or appropriateness, what 
does this say about the level of language competency in the rest of our society? Like and 
you know may facilitate some aspects of casual conversation, but can they be hindrances 
which prevent or discourage us from saying what we really think or mean? Are they 
"part of a national epidemic of incoherence," like the phrase, "that sucks," which Orr 
calls the "linguistic equivalent of duct tape, useful for holding disparate thoughts in rough 
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and temporary proximity to some vague emotion of dislike" (Orr 26)? 
Context is an important deciding factor here. If two teenage girls are talking on the 
phone and, as the research states, the innumerable like's -and you know's facilitate their 
conversation, there is no reason to discourage them. However in some cases, the 
frequent use of like and you know are distracting and actually hinder communication and 
understanding. There are times when more thoughtful words from our excitingly varied 
and rich storehouse of English vocabulary can give even everyday conversations more 
meaning, more clarity, and, for Pete's sake, more interest, than the incessant repetition of 
like and you know. There is a valid fear that we may lose the quaint and the picturesque, 
and sacrifice the subtlety and sophistication of our language for the sake of "greater 
efficiency" (Jucker 1739). When the two teens grow up, will they be able to present a 
prosecution summary in a court case, give coherent directions, teach an understandable 
lesson in a classroom, or even like you know give like an opinion in a college English 
class, you know? What are we NOT saying when we say like and you know? We are not 
saying alternate words which may be more accurate and specific, and we are in danger of 
losing vocabulary which is not only useful for conversation, but necessary for 
understanding written material in literature, history, and other disciplines, and for 
thinking about who we are and what we stand for. 
Perhaps, in our increasingly relativistic society where situational and moral absolutes 
hold less and less authority, the continuous use of like and you know reflect our deep 
need, as individuals and as a society, to compare our thoughts, conclusions, and actions to 
those of the people and world around us. Our distrust of the media to accurately report 
events and opinions leads us to become cautious in definitively stating that anyone has 
"said" anything. Convictions have been assaulted in the areas of government, culture, 
society, and—with the apparently increasing threat of environmental disaster—our natural 
world. In a era of doubt and uncertainty, the constant interjection of the discourse 
markers like and you know into our conversations, to reflect vagueness or uncertainty, 
allows us to grasp an extra second of thought here, a moment's mental respite there, as we 
struggle to understand our own thoughts and feelings, and the thoughts and feelings of 
those around us, in an increasingly accelerating and frighteningly vulnerable world: "Are 
you with me? Do you understand?" "Like, you know?" 
Like the Borg on Star Trek, the English language constantly assimilates—"to make or 
be like"(QED)—whatever is useful and new. In the case of like and you know, this 
tendency, like the Borg, may seem dangerous and overpowering. But just as Borg 
technology eventually became obsolete, the conversational applications of like and you 
know have changed and will continue to change. Like and you know are only one small 
part of the constant metamorphosis English is going through. In general, people seem to 
understand each other fairly well with them, or in spite of them, and even English majors 
and English teachers use them frequently. Pleased or not, like Rosamund's audience in As 
You Like It, we have to sit through it. The beauty of English is that it is a hardy language 




'Alternate terms for discourse marker, as discussed by Jucker, include pragmatic 
marker, discourse particle, pragmatic particle, pragmatic expression (especially for 
markers of more than one word, such as you know), and connective (Jucker and Ziv 1). 
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'David Sedaris analyzed the immersion method of teaching in his piece Me Talk 
Pretty One Day. Throughout the piece he argued whether the immersion method was a 
positive or negative way of learning a foreign language. His argument is weak. Sedaris 
is vague about his points for both the positive and negative side of his argument, basing 
them solely on personal experience. He lacks concrete evidence and fails to determine 
which side of his argument he will take. Instead of choosing one he states the immersion 
method is both good and bad. Based on Stephen Jay Gould's critique of an arguments in 
Sex, Drugs, Disasters and the Extinction of Dinosaurs, by filling his essay with 
speculation, not choosing a hypothesis, not supporting it, hiding behind humor to change 
his position, and using too much personal experience instead of fact, Sedaris doesn't meet 
the qualifications of a valid argument. 
Sedaris' attempts to argue that the immersion method of teaching are effective. 
He "moved to Paris to learn the language" (Sedaris 40), taking only "a month long French 
class" (Sedaris 39) in preparation. He did this because he believed the immersion method 
would be the easiest way of learning French. When he first moved there, he mentions 
that "everyone spoke what sounded to me like perfect French" (Sedaris 39), which led 
him to believe he too would soon grasp the language. His professor spoke "five fluent 
languages" and "her English is flawless" (Sedaris 41). Since Sedaris and his classmates 
are "forbidden to speak anything but French" (Sedaris 41), he is forced to learn the 
language sooner. The immersion method, he concludes, must be effective because if it 
isn't, he and his classmates will not be able to survive in France. Gould would critique 
this form of argument, because it lacks facts, and is full of assumptions. Gould stated that 
only by "separating fascinating claims from the methods that scientists use to establish 
the facts" (Gould 456) can an argument be validated. Sedaris had a great many claims, 
but failed to show how he came to these conclusions. 
Sedaris analyzed the immersion method of teaching a foreign language, but never 
took a side in his argument. Sedaris argued the ineffectiveness of the immersion method. 
Most students felt the "need to defend" themselves against being "publically ridiculed for 
your answer" (Sedaris 40) by their teacher. Students were afraid to answer questions or 
speak, because the classroom became a prison where these students were kept for 
emotional abuse. Yet, he argued that in "mid-October when the teacher singled me 
out,"(Sedaris 42), he realized that he understood. He stated that for the first time "I could 
understand every word someone was saying" (Sedaris 42). He was so excited that he was 
"bathing in the subtle beauty of each new curse and insult" (Sedaris 42). Since Gould 
argued that a valid argument must contain a hypothesis that can be either supported or 
disproved, Sedaris doesn't have a valid argument, because he doesn't have a hypothesis 
which he sticks to. 
Sedaris based his argument on personal experience. By bringing in other people 
like his classmates, Sedaris weakens his argument. He used them only to show he was 
criticized (Sedaris 39), not as support for or against the immersion method. With himself 
alone as evidence, he leaves room for speculation about the validity his statements, 
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because they aren't based on facts. Had Sedaris used statistics, or done a group study, his 
arguments would have been much more effective. Gould states that there is no room for 
"useless speculation" (Gould 457) in a valid argument. Gould states the argument must be 
supported by research based fact, a series of "testable proposals" (Gould 457) which 
support the hypothesis. By solely using personal experiences, Sedaris fails to develop 
these proposals and cannot test anything, causing him to develop vague conclusions. 
Sedaris uses humor throughout his essay to mask his lack of a hypothesis. He 
used irony and ethnic profiling to defer attention from his lack of an argument. Sedaris 
uses this humor enough that it appears his purpose for the piece was to use irony. When 
he is trying to prove the immersion method is good and he gets in a jam, he uses ethnic 
stereotypes to degrade his classmates and place himself as a superior: 
The teacher killed some time accusing the Yugoslavian girl of masterminding a 
program of genocide, and I jot ted frantic notes in the margins of my pad. While 
1 can honestly say that I lo ve leafing through medical textbooks devoted to 
severe dermatological conditions, it i s beyond the reach of my French 
vocabulary, and acting it out would only have invited unwanted attention 
(Sedaris 40). 
Sedaris also attempts this when arguing the immersion method is bad. While he claims 
his unhappiness, he attempts to lighten the mood by saying "I engage in the sort of 
conversation commonly overheard in refugee camps" (Sedaris 41). He constantly 
changes viewpoints on whether it is good or bad, easing the transition with humor to 
make his writing less confusing. If he were straightforward with what he fails to argue, 
there would be no essay, because the one thing holding it together would collapse. 
Gould argued that the qualifications for a valid argument are: a hypothesis must 
be set in place and must be testable, the argument must not be full of "silly speculation," 
(Gould 457) but supported by fact, and that the argument should be a "fruitful mode of 
inquiry, not a list of enticing conclusions" (Gould 456). I le is an inductive reasoner who 
builds a case for what is argument and has very specific standards. Sedaris fails to come 
up with a hypothesis, is vague with his arguments, and masks his essay with humor and 
speculation. Gould would call Sedaris on all of these points and discredit his entire essay, 
for failing to meet his standards of a valid argument. 
Gould, Stephen Jay. "Sex, Drugs, Disasters, and the Extinction of Dinosaurs." 75 
Readings Plus. Ed. Santi V. Buscemi. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004. 456-463. 
Sedaris, David. "Me Talk Pretty One Day." 75 Readings Plus. Ed. Santi V. Buscemi. 





'*Body Ritual Among the Nacirema" is an anthropological essay that separates the 
audience from the author's rhetorical purpose. The author, Horace Miner, uses irony to 
show that American customs are far from flawless. Miner attacks the customs of the 
modern American society, and calls for it to stop criticizing other cultures. 
The first issue Miner exploits is the American image of the body. He states that in 
Nacirema culture "the fundamental belief underlying the whole system appears to be that 
the human body is ugly" (347). Here irony takes hold, for Nacirema is American spelled 
backward, yet this is how tough America really is on the body. American culture is 
constantly attacking the physic of its citizens, pushing men to be tall, muscular, and 
macho. Women are portrayed as housewives and sex objects, reducing them to servants 
of the male dominated American society. Miner attacks not only the imagery of ugliness, 
but body size as well. " There are ritual fasts to make the fat thin and ceremonial feasts to 
make the thin people fat" (350). If America condemns ugliness then, why does it criticize 
its citizens for their weight, stating they are both too fat or too thin no matter their size? 
By exploiting the irony of these "rituals," Miner demands a halt to the savage Nacireman 
custom of tearing apart fellow "neophytes,"(349) in attempt to fit into an unattainable 
mold known as American image. 
Miner emphasizes the importance of facial appearance in Nacirema culture. 
Miner analyzes the pain that Americans are willing to put themselves through to avoid 
"ugliness." He starts with American dentistry rituals, validating them by saying 
Americans are so paranoid about keeping their mouth clean, because they live in fear: the 
fear of "teeth would fall out, gums bleed, jaws shrink, friends dessert them, (and) lovers 
reject them" (348). What is customary in American dentistry rituals, is viewed as part of 
the "masochistic tendencies"(349) of Nacireman culture by onlookers. Miner describes 
many dental practices as having "a certain amount of sadism involved" (349). Americans 
are willing to have an "awl" jabbed "into an exposed nerve," and "have large sections of 
one or more teeth gouged out so that the supernatural substance can be applied" (348). 
Citizen are enduring all of this pain for social acceptance and beauty. Why would any 
person want to feel this pain for a standard which no real person could fit into? Miner 
also examines men's shaving. He asks why would a custom of "scraping and lacerating 
the surface of the face" (349) become so commonplace. He again creates this barbaric 
imagery when confronting women and the ceremony of baking "their heads in small 
ovens" (349) when they are getting their hair done. Miner enforces the statement that 
"the fundamental belief...(is) the human body is ugly" (347) and is in desperate need 
repair. Miner is calling for American society to address this huge issue of "ugliness" and 
stop feeding into it. 
Miner shows the class division in America is growing into a larger problem, 
through the irony of Nacirema. The rich are getting richer, while the poor are getting 
poorer. More Americans are claiming that they are in the middle class when really they 
are well below the poverty line. Miner uses irony to show this in rituals like that of the 
"shrines," (347) or bathrooms. He incorporates hygiene and beauty with class struggle by 
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using bathrooms as his tool to show economic class. "The more powerful individuals 
have several shrines,"(347) while some households can barely keep maintaining one. 
Similarly, Miner describes class construction through the condition of houses. "Most 
houses are of wattle and daub construction" (347); most American homes are falling apart 
under financial burden. Lower class Nacirema have to suffer, while "the shrine rooms of 
the more wealthy are walled with stone" (347). They don't have the money to repair it 
properly, so they expend more money in the long run to repair things multiple times. 
Miner again is calling for American to stop criticizing and focus less on "economic 
pursuits" (347). 
Miner uses irony to critique sexism in America. He indirectly shows the presence 
of sexism, without analyzing the magnitude of the problem. He does this because that is 
how society has treated sexism, acts as if it doesn't exist anymore. All of the highlighted 
people in the text such as doctors and dentists are men: "medicine men" (349) and "holy-
mouth men" (348). There is no mention of females in these practices, much like older 
American educational texts leave women contributors out of their published works. 
Miner suggests that the masculine slant is creating a detrimental void between the sexes. 
The hospital system is a prime example of where females are subjected to dehumanizing 
practices when their "naked bodies" (something he makes very clear be private, sacred, 
ans secret) "are subjected to scrutinizing manipulation and prodding of the medicine 
men" (349). Men in this world are dominating the way women's bodies should look and 
are causing an invalid feeling to sweep the nation of its daughters. If women's breasts are 
too large or too small, they are influenced to have surgery to "fix" them to the 
"appropriate size,"(3 50) even if they then become fake, which they are then criticized for 
as well. This enforces the ridicule of the human body as the basis of society. Women are 
under constant surveillance and ridicule. When they are pregnant, society pushes women 
to wear clothes that would "hide pregnancy," (350) because that is seen as socially 
unacceptable. Miner as an anthropologist is asking, how America, home of the free and 
the brave, scrutinize its women so much and show such inequality in its land? 
Miner speaks about psychology in American culture. As an anthropologist. Miner 
uses this to study American behavior through another lense. He analyses the American 
psyche, finding that it has been blind to it's cultural flaws. By distancing his readers 
through the use of irony, Miner is asking his audience to start critiquing and confronting 
the internal issues that plague society. In America "the culture of this people is very 
poorly understood," (346) not only by others but also by its own and is in dire need of 
reform. 
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'Historically, men were always thought to have been the intellectually superior 
sex. Stephen Jay Gould writes the essay "Women's Brains" to prove this theory 
scientifically, but uses faulty data and sexist thinking to manipulate his results. Author 
Mary Catherine Bateson in her essay "Attending a World" argues that women's brains are 
better equipped at excelling in more than one area at a time and are better multi-taskers 
than men. Through research, it can be proven that though men score higher on 
intelligence testing; this does not prove that men are intellectually superior to women. 
Measurements such as IQ tests are inherently biased towards men and thus cause these 
discrepancies. 
Gould's essay uses brain measurement to prove that a larger brain is a better brain, 
and that since a typical man's brain is larger than a typical woman's, that he is smarter. 
The first problem in Gould's research is that he already concludes that men are superior 
to women before gathering any data. Gould did not start with an open question of who is 
more intelligent, but instead men are more intelligent, and here is why. For example 
Gould declares, "We must not forget that women are, on average, a little less intelligent 
than men." He goes on to say, "We are therefore permitted to suppose that the relatively 
small size of the female brain depends in part on her physical inferiority and in part on 
her intellectual inferiority" (359). These statements clearly infer that Gould's mind was 
already made up before any data was gathered. Gould's study finds that men are superior 
in their intelligence, but his methods are widely discredited. He researches and measures 
a total of only seven male skulls and six female skulls for his experiment. This does not 
give the researcher a broad enough sample to use, and it is even suggested that Gould 
specifically looked for large male skulls and small female skulls to prove his point (360-
361). Commonly read studies like this perpetuate the myth of male intellectual 
superiority that authors like Mary Catherine Bateson try to combat by writing a more 
factual and credible argumentative essay. 
Bateson's argument is more correct than Gould's and develops around the idea 
that men and women's brains do indeed work very differently, but that the difference 
cannot be labeled as "superior" or "inferior." Bateson suggests that men are 
straightforward thinkers, focused heavily on one idea or task and that women can balance 
many tasks at one time successfully (96-97). This difference may be genetic, but since 
Bateson is not a neuroscientist but an anthropologist, she uses sociological and 
anthropological explanations to why this difference exists. "Women...have spent years 
with one ear open for the cry of an awakened child, the knock of someone making a 
delivery, [and] the smell of burning" (96). Women are mothers, wives, homemakers, 
cooks, seamstresses and cleaners, while traditionally, men are simply professionals. Men 
and women are socialized differently, so a woman's brain changes as she grows up to suit 
her needs as a multi-tasker. More research than ever has acknowledged the brain function 
and intellectual differences between the sexes, but that these differences are accredited to 
environmental and social factors as well as one's physical brain makeup. 
The debate on whether nature or nurture determines intellectual status has rested 
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on the idea that both contribute very much to intelligence. 
It is no secret that, despite similarities, men and women are different. The genders think, 
act and communicate differently. They even react to illness and healing therapies 
differently. To what extent do the innate differences of male and female manifest 
themselves in the brain, that most complex of human organs? {The Dana Brain 
Daybook: What's New in Neuroscience) 
Many seek answers to the above question, and there have been numerous studies on the 
topic. Researchers cannot ignore the fact that men score higher on IQ and SAT tests than 
women do. IQ tests (intelligence quotient) measure the mental age of the test taker and 
compare it to the chronological age of the participant to determine their scholastic and 
potential occupational achievements. IQ tests are the most accurate tests so far in 
determining intelligence, especially when categorizing subjects as mentally retarded or as 
geniuses (Dobzhansky 39). In The Intelligence Men: Makers of the IQ Controversy, a 
book written by Raymond E. Francher on the subject, he found that men outscore women 
in mathematical and visuospacial tests while women outscore men in verbal, articulation, 
fluency and grammar tests. This difference is thought to be caused by the different size 
and also how frequently those parts of the brain are used in men and women (17, 42, 
182). A study done by the Department of Clinical Radiology at the University of 
Munster, Germany concluded the same results (1). Dr. Godfrey Pearlson of Johns 
Hopkins University, in a recent investigation published in The Dana Brain Daybook 
neuroscience newsletter, reported too, that the left inferior parietal lobes in men are larger 
than in women, and that this is a very critical when assessing visuospacial tasks. Dr. 
Pearlson also found that the area controlling language was larger in a woman's brain than 
in a man's brain, and that this accounts for women's higher scores in the field (2). These 
results are largely based on performances on IQ tests. While IQ tests are our most 
reliable source for measuring intelligence, they are not with some faults. 
A major fault is that many times, the test is found to be biased towards men, 
causing men to score higher than women. For example, men tend to score higher on 
mathematical sections of the test, but the questions asked in this section almost always 
have male connotations. A sample IQ question that favors male success is from The IQ 
Mythology by Elain Mensh and Harry Mensh, 
The pictures in the box go together a certain way. We say: 'Boy is to trouser as girl is to 
what'? [The pictures in the box are of a white boy and girl and a pair of pants. The 
answer is to be chosen from adjoining pictures of a dress, a roller skate, a bicycle and a 
white doll.] to earn a score on this analogy...a child must accept an inaccurate, sexist 
premise., most girls wear blue jeans these days as often as they wear dresses (54). 
SAT questions in math can also be sexist. For example, the biggest difference between 
the scores of women and the scores of men came when subjects are asked to compute a 
sports team win/loss record. Women's SAT scores are lower than men's, even though 
overall, females' GPA's (grade point averages) in math exceed males (70). This proves 
that even though there are differences between a man and a woman's brain, the 
differences are exploited in standardized tests which are written and assessed by an 
overwhelmingly male majority. 
All the gathered data and research leads to several conclusions, that men and 
women do indeed have differences in the brain that affect certain types of intelligence and 
also that these differences are exaggerated due to environmental factors. Men are more 
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inclined to exceed in math, while women enjoy success in language. However, due to 
some flaws in standardized testing, these discrepancies are inflated as average GPA's do 
not concur with SAT and IQ results. Also, in school, teachers encourage boys to learn 
and succeed in math and science, while encouraging girls to do well in art and English: 
"As children grow older, these social pressures not only become stronger in general but 
are reinforced in particular by schools, which treat boys as better suited in math than 
girls" (Mensh 69). Stephen Jay Gould in "Women's Brains" grossly embellished his 
findings to conclude that men are smarter than women. Mary Catherine Bateson in her 
essay "Attending a World" acknowledged a difference in brain function between the 
sexes, and used the genetic differences and the environmental factors to conclude that 
women and men both excel intellectually in different ways, but by no means can research 
conclude that one gender is "intellectually superior" to the other. 
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Jn her essay "Calculated Risks," K.C. Cole attempts to resolve some basic 
questions about risk taking. Who is taking which risks and why? What is this decision 
based on? Cole finds the answer is never simple or logical. Calculating risks is a 
Western phenomenon, but taking risks dates back to human evolution. Also dating back 
to human evolution is the idea that people are immune from tragedy; they know there is a 
risk, but it will undoubtedly happen to someone else. Cole calls this idea Self 
Preservation, the preservation of one's self from injury or harm. If every person thought 
that once they stepped out the door they were doomed to tragedy, no on would leave the 
house, so they use Self Preservation as a defense mechanism. Also, Cole recognizes that 
people choose to take risks that are inconsistent with what scientific and professional risk 
analysis concludes. She ultimately determines that these risks are based not on fact or 
probability, but on personal experience and familiarity with the situation. The more 
exotic and unfamiliar the risk, the less likely a person will engage in the activity. 
However, if the person is familiar with the situation, he or she will most likely engage in 
the behavior no matter how dangerous. 
Cole reminds readers that only recent Western though attaches numbers to risk. 
Mathematicians, scientists, researchers and policy makers calculate risk and use the 
information to relate any behavior to any consequence. A statistician can "attach 
numbers to the risk of getting breast cancer or AIDs to flying and food additives to 
getting hit by lightning or falling in the bathtub" (153). Comparing such arbitrary 
behaviors is not helpful in real-life risk assessment, and those who blindly believe such 
erratic comparisons are "downright silly" (155). Westerners may have been the first to 
mathematically calculate risks, but taking risks helped humans evolve millions of years 
ago all over the world. Without taking risks, humans would not have hunted and killed, 
moved from continent to continent or been able to make fire. Without swallowing some 
fear, people today would not make it out their door in the morning, fearing the car they 
drive or the polluted air they breathe. Humans evolved by taking risks and therefore 
evolved to take risks, but the risks some choose to take are irrational and inconsistent. 
An irrational risk is one in which noted risk probability is ignored and the person engages 
in the risky behavior anyway, even if it decreases his or her chance of survival, such as 
drinking and driving. An example of an inconsistent risk is not eating foods grown with 
pesticides, but eating fatty foods even if this too will decrease their chance of survival. 
When there is a statistic published, people take one look at it and arbitrarily 
decide to believe it or not. Even if every statistic came with the same credentials, people 
would pick and choose which studies to believe. Newsweek magazine printed a statistic 
that sent many women into a state of panic; the statistic concluded that college-educated 
women over the age of thirty five had a greater chance of being the victim of a terrorist 
attack than they did of finding a husband. This outrageous statistic seems unbelievable, 
yet many women chose to believe it. The same women, however, smoke cigarettes and 
chose to ignore the much more plausible Surgeon's General warning on their pack of 
Virginia Slims. Another mind blowing example comes from Mathematician Sam C. 
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Sounders of Washington State University who gives an instance where illogical choices 
are made concerning risk. Sounders concluded that if one pack of cigarettes out of 18, 
250 contained a cigarette packed with dynamite instead of tobacco, 1,600 people a day 
would die instantly from the explosion. If that were true, Sounders and most others agree 
that cigarettes would no doubt be banned. The irony is that 1,600 people a day do die 
from cigarette related illnesses, yet cigarettes are still legal; statistically, the risk is the 
same. Smokers, however, do not equate these two statistics and ignore the risk. Cole 
suggests this is because personal egos get in the way of accurately and fairly judging 
one's own chance of consequence. This inconvenient experience is deemed Self 
Preservation. Self preservation is when a person tries to maintain their healthy existence 
and avoid risk or injury. It is inconvenient because it can blind a person from obvious 
risks; they ignore the danger because they rely on the self preservation, and convince 
themselves that they will avoid injury. 
Cole alludes to the fact that people take risks that they know are dangerous 
because they think they are somehow immune from tragedy or consequence. Almost 
everything carries some risk: driving, exercising, and even dating. Some activities carry 
more risk than others, and many people still choose to engage in them. For example, 
having unprotected sex is an explicit danger when sexually transmitted diseases like HIV 
are more prominent than ever before. Cole is deliberate in observing that no one who 
engages in these behaviors actually thinks that they will fall victim to its penalty, though 
they know others do daily, even hourly. Cole does not blame this behavior on the 
individual; it is a natural experience that dates back to evolution. Without feeling 
somewhat invincible, no one would take risks on anything and the human race, or the 
modern individual, wouldn't make any progress and show no change or growth. Self 
preservation may answer many of the questions about personal risk assessment. Self 
preservation gives a person permission to participate in risky behavior, and participation 
in this behavior can lead to positive changes when it involves taking a risk that pays off in 
the end. Without taking risks, nothing would ever change and make for a bleak and 
simple existence. Self preservation sanctions some risky actions and makes for some 
general improvements if taking the risk ends in success. 
True, people will rationalize the decisions they make with the statement "It won't 
happen to me." Self preservation explains why some people take risks that they know are 
dangerous, but what risks are they cautious of? Some are cautious and don't swim in the 
ocean because they are scared of sharks, but they will swim in a swimming pool and dive 
off a diving board, even though this is probably a much more dangerous action. Cole 
doesn't try to resolve this quagmire, but she does find it important to emphasize, as 
evident by her numerous examples of irrational and inconsistent behavior, such as the 
study with the exploding cigarettes and statistics of cigarette related deaths. Familiar 
consequences versus unknown consequences are often the deciding factor for taking risks, 
not the risks themselves. Cole's essay ultimately concludes that what risks people choose 
to take and why they take them is based on personal experience. Cole gives another 
example of someone living happily on the dangerous San Andreas Fault who is afraid of a 
New York City subway and vice versa. Why isn't this person scared of the Fault? They 
don't fear this risk because he or she is familiar with it, and they are scared of the subway 
because it is foreign and unknown. The only rational reason Cole implies about why 
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some people take some risks and not others, is experience. The deciding factor is 
certainly not frequency of consequences, as proven by all of the above examples. 
Frequency of danger is usually not considering in people's risk assessment or no one 
would be smoking, driving or using diving boards. What is considered is how familiar 
the person is with the consequence; if it is common but still dangerous, he or she will 
most likely still take the risk. 
K.C. Cole focuses on how people assess risk, especially personal risk and why it 
is often inconsistent with professional assessment. People generally fear the unknown, 
the unexpected. Books entitled, "How to Survive Anything" are published in which the 
author tells how to manage a poisonous snake bite or how to cute loose from a parachute 
should it land in a tree. These are things people are afraid of, no matter how low the 
chance of it happening, because these are things they are not familiar with. Familiarity 
breeds comfort, but comfort isn't everything; there is a lot to be said for living life fully 
and freely. Cole doesn't neglect to remind readers, however, that life is a time to have 
fun and take risks; she quotes anthropologist Melvin Konner in saying, "I sometimes 
think that the more reckless among us may have something to teach the careful about the 
kind of immortality that comes from living fully everyday" (162). 
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The College Writing Committee is pleased to announce Cortland's Ninth Annual Writing 
Contest. The Committee will present six awards for outstanding undergraduate and graduate 
student papers in the following categories: 
Academic writing (papers based on sources or other data 
*•* Fiction (short stories), poetry, scripts, and creative nonfiction 
••• Web page design (Judges will place emphasis on writing content. Pages should contain a 
minimum of 500 words of written text). 
* First place winners will receive a cash prize ol $ 100 and have their writing 
published and presented on Scholars' Day. 
* Papers written lor courses taken in 2006 (winter session, spring semester, summer 
session, fall semester) are eligible. Papers may be submitted by instructors or by the 
students themselves any time between December 5. 2006 and February 2. 2007. 
GU1DF.I .1NES FOR STUDENTS SUBMITTING PAPERS 
Send the following items to the ASAP office, A-l 1 V an Hoesen Hall: 
1. Paper, with a title. In the upper right-hand corner of the paper, type: 
* Cortland ID number 
* Category for work (academic writing; fiction, poetry, scripts, creative nonfiction; 
web page design) 
2. A separate cover sheet with: 
* Cortland ID number 
* Full name, address, phone number, and email address 
* Year of study (freshman, sophomore, ...) 
* Course and professor for whom the paper was written 
* Major 
* Date you are submitting the paper 
If you have any questions, contact Professor Kennedy at 753-2086 or 
at kcnncdym@cortland.edu. 
